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Abstract 
Psychometrics and the representational theory of measurement (RTM) are widely used in social 
scientific measurement. They are currently pursued largely in isolation from one another. I argue 
that despite their separation in practice, RTM and psychometrics are complementary approaches, 
because they can contribute in complementary ways to the establishment of what I argue is a crucial 
measurement property, namely, Representational Interpretability. Because RTM and psychometrics 
are complementary in the establishment of Representational Interpretability, the current 
separation of measurement approaches is unfounded. 
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1 Introduction 
Measures of social scientific concepts such as aptitude, well-being, and depression play a key role 
in determining life-changing decisions, from university admissions to drug approval and national 
economic policies. These measures had better be good to warrant their status as life-changers. But 
the scientific experts are divided on the question: how do we determine whether a social scientific 
measure is valid or not? Different views on what determines measure validity imply divergent 
commitments on deep philosophical questions, such as questions pertaining to observation, 
representation, modeling and theorizing. For instance, conceptions of measure validity often specify 
conditions under which an instrument’s readings provide an adequate representation of the 
measurand. 1  They may also specify what kinds of relations between theory, models and 
observations allow inferences concerning measure validity.2  The study of approaches to social 
scientific measurement therefore links directly with issues that have traditionally concerned 
philosophers of science.  
 There are, broadly speaking, two approaches to measurement in social sciences: 
psychometrics and the representational theory of measurement (RTM).3 Roughly, the psychometric 
approach focuses on testing associations between tests that usually have the form of a 
questionnaire, while RTM conceives of measurement in terms of so-called representation and 
uniqueness theorems. Both approaches are widely used, but they are pursued largely in isolation of 
one another. Proponents of RTM infrequently venture into employing psychometric techniques, and 
psychometricians are rarely aware of the existence of RTM.  
Such a separation is hardly surprising when viewed in light of the history of RTM. The 
authors who lay the ground for RTM, as expressed in the three-volume Foundations of 
Measurement4, were partly motivated by their disappointment with psychometrics, which had 
																																																								
1 For example (Suppes and Zinnes [1963], section 2.3). 
2 For example (McClimans et al [2017]; Alexandrova and Haybron [2016]). 
3 See for example (Angner [2011]; Judd and McClelland [1998]). 
4 (Krantz et al [1971]; Suppes et al [1989]; Luce et al [1990]). 
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dominated social scientific measurement at least since 1930s.5 In the beginning of the first volume 
of Foundations of Measurement, philosopher Patrick Suppes and psychologists David Krantz, R. 
Duncan Luce and Amos Tversky express discontent with psychometrics, arguing that it is ‘far from 
clear’ how to interpret the measurement results psychometric instruments yield. Elsewhere Suppes 
complains that psychometrics consists of an ‘array of bewildering and conflicting catechisms’.6 
According to Suppes it is unclear how following these catechisms is supposed to result in genuine 
measurement, whereas RTM provides a non-dogmatic framework for social scientific measurement. 
But psychometricians have been averse to RTM, and little of Suppes’ and other’s work 
has been adopted by psychometricians. According to Norman Cliff ([1992]), the main reason is that 
the abstract mathematical apparatus that RTM employs is foreign to psychometricians. Cliff argues 
that it has been difficult for psychometricians to see how the general mathematical principles of 
RTM can be made to apply to specific empirical issues. Some philosophers of science enforce this 
conclusion, claiming that RTM is too narrow to be useful for the practical execution of 
measurement.7 Nonetheless RTM seems to have resonated well with economists, who use formal 
techniques abundantly. In a sense RTM and economics were allied from the start, because Suppes 
and others frequently mention economists’ attempts to measure utility as examples of RTM.8  
The fact that two approaches have not meshed in practice does not imply that they 
are incompatible in principle. Alas, there is no consensus on the interrelations between RTM and 
psychometrics. The literature that explores such connections sends mixed messages about the 
compatibility of the two. For example, philosopher Erik Angner ([2011]) has argued that the two are 
incompatible in such a way that a simultaneous endorsement of them would lead to inconsistency. 
By contrast, in their introduction to social scientific measurement, Charles Judd and Gary McClelland 
[1998] indicate that RTM and psychometrics could in principle inform and even complement each 
other. But complementarity is not the focus of their article, and the proposal has not been pursued 
further. 
In this paper I deliver on the vague suspicion of complementarity. I argue that despite 
their isolation in practice, RTM and psychometrics are complementary. By this Complementarity 																																																								
5 This conservative estimate is based on the fact that the Psychometric Society was founded in 
1935. 
6 (Suppes and Zinnes [1963], p. 3). 
7 (Mari et al [2017]; Boumans [2016]; Reiss [2008], chapter 4). 
8 For example (Krantz et al [1971], p. 9; Luce and Tukey [1964]). 
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Claim I mean that RTM and psychometrics can contribute in different but interlocking ways to the 
establishment of a measurement property I call Representational Interpretability. Roughly speaking, 
Representational Interpretability is the requirement that relations between numbers are 
interpretable in terms of empirical relations in the measured system. I argue that RTM contributes 
to Representational Interpretability by establishing conditional statements of the form: if conditions 
x, y, and z are fulfilled, then we have an interpretable numerical representation. Techniques within 
psychometrics contribute to Representational Interpretability by providing evidence for or against 
the antecedent of the conditional. The upshot of the argument is that RTM and psychometrics are 
complementary. While this does not mean that psychometrics and RTM have to be always used in 
conjunction with one another (for example, measurement in the physical sciences proceeds fine 
without psychometrics), the Complementarity Claim should urge us to rethink the current 
separation of the two approaches. 
Measurement has been increasingly on philosophers’ radar. With literatures on 
general measurement theory and measurement in the physical sciences already well established,9 
philosophers have grown increasingly interested in the challenges of social scientific measurement 
(see for example McClimans et al [2017]; Isaac [2017]; Alexandrova [2017]; Alexandrova and 
Haybron [2016]; Cartwright et al [2016]; Boumans [2016]; Heilmann [2015]; Hood [2015]; Angner 
[2011]; Reiss [2008]). The present paper contributes to philosophical measurement scholarship by 
explicating and arguing for the importance of Representational Interpretability and by laying out the 
roles RTM and psychometrics can play in its fulfillment. In particular, the argument engages with 
philosophers’ recent claims about the practical limitations of RTM,10 showing what RTM – when 
appropriately interpreted – has to offer for social scientific measure validation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 characterizes RTM and psychometrics. 
Section 3 explains the Complementarity Claim conceptually. Section 4 details an example of 
complementarity. Section 5 concludes with potential objections and practical implications of the 
argument. 
 
																																																								
9 See for example (Chang [2004]; van Fraassen [2008]; Frigerio et al [2010]; Soler et al [2013]; 
Riordan [2015]). Tal ([2013]) provides a historical overview. 
10 (Mari et al [2017]; Boumans [2015]; Reiss [2008, ch. 4]). 
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2 Two Approaches to Measurement 
2.1 RTM 
The RTM approach received its canonical statement in Foundations of Measurement, which was 
written by philosopher Patrick Suppes and psychologists R. Duncan Luce, Amos Tversky and David 
Krantz. According to RTM, measurement involves ‘the construction of homomorphisms (scales) 
from empirical relational structures of interest to numerical structures that are useful’ (Krantz et al 
[1971], p. 9). Homomorphisms are many-to-one mappings. In RTM these mappings are from the 
empirical relational structures to numerical ones. To measure, one needs to prove two types of 
theorems. A representation theorem establishes that if a given empirical relational structure of 
interest satisfies certain (non-contradictory) axioms, then a homomorphism ϕ to a certain numerical 
structure can be established. A uniqueness theorem establishes the permissible transformations of 
ϕ that also yield a homomorphism to the same numerical structure.  
 It is common to distinguish at least three types of homomorphisms, i.e. scales: ratio, 
interval, and ordinal.11 Ordinal scales, such as Mohs hardness scale for minerals, allow monotonic 
increasing transformations of the form 𝜙 → 𝑓(𝜙).	Such transformations preserve order relations, 
as the name of the scale suggests. Interval scales, e.g. temperature measured in Celsius, represent 
equality and inequality of intervals of the target attribute. For such scales, the permissible 
transformations are of the form 𝜙 → 𝛼𝜙 + 𝑏, 𝛼 > 0. Ratio scales, such as length, represent equality 
and inequality of intervals and have a non-arbitrary zero point so that equalities and inequalities of 
ratios are meaningful. Ratio scales allow for multiplicative transformation of the form 𝜙 → 𝛼𝜙, 𝛼 >0. The latter two scale types are usually called quantitative or cardinal. 
In the RTM approach, measurement is based on empirical relational structures, which 
are, roughly, sets of relations that can hold between entities in the target domain. In order to 
measure, one has to establish the fulfillment of relational constraints that guarantee the existence 
of a mapping from an empirical structure to a numerical one. These constraints are stated in axioms. 
For example, the axioms pertaining to ordinal scales are:  
 
																																																								
11 On other scale types, see (Suppes and Zinnes [1963]). 
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Let A be a finite set of objects, and ≽ a binary relation on A. The relational structure (≽,A) can be 
meaningfully represented on an ordinal scale, iff for all 𝑎, 𝑏,	𝑐  ∈A, 
 
1. Connectedness: Either 𝑎 ≽	𝑏 or 𝑏 ≽	𝑎, and 
2. Transitivity: If 𝑎 ≽	𝑏 and 𝑏 ≽	𝑐, then 𝑎 ≽	𝑐. 
 
For example: the set A of objects denotes commodity bundles, and the relation ≽ denotes a 
preference relation, i.e. 𝑎  ≽	𝑏  means 𝑎  is at least as preferred as 𝑏. If the empirical relation ≽ 
satisfies connectedness and transitivity, then one can prove a representation theorem: there is a 
function 𝜙 from A to the set of real numbers such that for all commodity bundles 𝑎 and 𝑏 in A, 𝑎 ≽	𝑏 iff 𝜙(𝑎) ≥ 𝜙(𝑏).	In informal terms, the preference relation ≽ holds between 𝑎 and 𝑏 if and only 
if the number associated with 𝑎 is greater than or equal to the number associated to 𝑏. Another 
function 𝜙′ has the same property and thus constitutes a homomorphism to the same numerical 
structure as 𝜙 iff there is a strictly increasing function 𝑓 such that for all 𝑎 in A, 𝜙4(𝑎) = 	𝑓[𝜙(𝑎)]. 
In informal terms, 𝜙′ is a permissible transformation of 𝜙 as long as it preserves the order of the 
numbers assigned to the objects. 
 Interpretations of RTM are debated in philosophical literature (Tal [2012]).  For 
example, there is disagreement on whether RTM applies to unobservable attributes (Vessonen 
[2017]; Heilmann [2015]; Angner [2011]; Mari [2000]) and whether RTM is an epistemological or a 
merely formal theory of measurement (Tal [2012]). I will come back to some of these debates, but 
for now I will use this summary: a) according to RTM, measurement requires the establishment of 
homomorphisms between empirical and numerical structures, and b) RTM delivers on this 
requirement in the form of representation and uniqueness theorems. This summary stems from the 
canonical Foundations of Measurement, where the focus is almost exclusively on proving theorems 
to establish homomorphisms. Some proponents of RTM would agree that measurement requires 
more than just proving theorems. That in no way contradicts my summary of RTM. The point is that 
RTM itself focuses on and delivers representation and uniqueness theorems.12  
 																																																								
12 My interpretation of RTM bears similarities to those expressed in (Heilmann [2015]; Narens and 
Luce [1993]). 
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2.2 Psychometrics 
The concept of psychometric validation has several meanings in contemporary literature (Markus 
and Borsboom [2013] provide an overview). The following characterization captures the big picture, 
ignoring subtleties. On the psychometric approach, one starts off by characterizing the target 
construct, i.e. the latent variable of interest, such as well-being or aptitude, and by proposing a 
measure, usually in the form of a questionnaire, of that construct. One also offers a specification of 
independent variables that are taken to be relevant for explaining or predicting the observed test 
scores (dependent variable), and specifies an assumption or a model of how those independent 
variables combine to predict the observed score. For example, the Classical Test Theory (CTT) 
approach assumes that the observed test score is a function of so-called true test score and 
measurement error. CTT is a dominant approach to thinking about the determinants of the observed 
score (Engelhard [2013]), but several alternative models are gaining currency within psychometrics.  
Once these assumptions about the target construct have been made, one proceeds to 
administer the test and run a series of statistical tests on the response data to check whether the 
measure has the desirable properties that a validated measure is supposed to have. To give an 
example, some tests are meant to determine the extent to which assumptions about the 
determinants of the observed score hold. Another category of tests involves checking for so-called 
construct validity, which is thought of as the test of the degree to which the measure captures the 
construct it is supposed to capture. To establish construct validity, one checks that the results of the 
proposed measure converge with results from other measures that are theorized to capture the 
same target attribute and that the results diverge from measures that have other attributes as their 
theorized targets (see Cronbach and Meehl [1955]; Campbell and Fiske [1956]). There is a multitude 
of other tests of validity, the details of which do not concern us here. 
 
2.3 Representational interpretability 
RTM and psychometrics conceive of measurement in different ways: RTM focuses on proving 
theorems while psychometrics focuses on statistical tests on empirical data. It is not surprising that 
such seemingly different perspectives on measurement have not meshed. As mentioned, the 
developers of RTM frequently framed RTM as the correct way to do social scientific measurement, 
which they thought was unjustifiably dominated by psychometricians’ ‘bewildering and conflicting 
catechisms’ (Suppes and Zinnes [1963]; see also Krantz et al [1971], ch. 1). But RTM did not resonate 
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with psychometricians, partly because it seemed so far removed from empirical applications (Cliff 
[1992]; Luce [1997]; see also Mari et al [2017]; Reiss [2008]). Thus psychometrics carried on largely 
unaffected by mathematical theories of measurement, and RTM found its allies in economics, where 
proving representation and uniqueness theorems is part and parcel of measurement practice. The 
disciplinary divide has prompted some philosophers to claim that the two approaches are in some 
sense incompatible (Angner [2011]).  
Despite this seeming incompatibility of the two, and the historical divide between 
their proponents, I argue that RTM and psychometrics are methodological complements. By this I 
mean that they contribute different types of evidence to the establishment of a crucial 
measurement property. The insights each supplies complements the one provided by the other.  
To make this argument I will focus on what I call the requirement of Representational 
Interpretability, which I define as follows:  
 
Representational Interpretability1 (RI1): The requirement for Representational 
Interpretability is fulfilled if and only if specified relationships between numbers 
assigned to entities have an interpretation in terms of relationships between those 
entities, when those entities are compared in terms of the target attribute. 
 
The definition is a mouthful, but the idea is simple. Consider a situation where we have evidence 
that Maya has transitive strict preferences over cakes: Lemon ≻ Strawberry ≻ Chocolate. Here the 
relevant entities are cakes. They are being compared in terms of preferences, which is the target 
attribute. When thus compared, the relevant empirical relation between the cakes is ordering. In 
order to be Representationally Interpretable in this case, a numerical representation has to capture 
the (preference) ordering of the cakes by assigning numbers to cakes such that the numbers have 
the correct ordering relation to each other, for example Lemon → 3, Strawberry → 2 and Chocolate 
→ 1.  
 As the example suggests, the intuition behind Representational Interpretability is 
simple: representation of preference order requires ordered numbers. Its fulfillment in practice, 
however, is complicated. Firstly, we want to represent more complex empirical structures than 
ordering. The complexity of the structures increases as we expand the class of represented 
relationships, which in turn increases the difficulty of establishing Representational Interpretability. 
Second, Representational Interpretability is an empirical requirement. We need evidence that the 
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relevant relations in fact exist in the target system – we cannot just stipulate this. For example, for 
the ordered numbers to be interpretable in terms of Maya’s preferences, evidence from, say, stated 
preference questionnaires should reliably show that Maya indeed has the transitive preferences 
expressed in the example. But if different questionnaires yield contradicting evidence, the 
fulfillment of Representational Interpretability is not clear. Such underdetermination need not 
worry us now though, for the aim is not to provide an all-purpose manual for handling contradicting 
evidence, but to zoom in on the roles RTM and psychometrics can play in establishing 
Representational Interpretability. 
 That measurement requires something like Representational Interpretability is 
acknowledged implicitly and explicitly across measurement scholarship.13 When a psychometrician 
assumes that the target attribute is measured on a certain scale something like the requirement of 
Representational Interpretability is usually evoked implicitly. Furthermore, it is implicit in the set-
up of RTM that Representational Interpretability is a crucial component of measurement, but the 
founders of RTM did not explicate the concept. Its significance might have also been ignored 
because the formalism of RTM is off-putting and impenetrable to many. Either way, 
Representational Interpretability has not been previously explicated in an accessible way. 
Consequently, the complementary roles of RTM and psychometrics in the establishment of this 
property have not been appreciated. 
The requirement of Representational Interpretability fits neatly with a recent 
philosophical theory of measurement proposed by Cartwright et al ([2016]). They include 
representation as a requirement, focusing on representation theorems and the coordination of how 
an instrument indicates manifestations of the target attribute. I endorse these requirements, but 
want to add that there is more to representation than proving representation theorems and 
coordinating the indicator–attribute relationship. The additional step requires us to collect reliable 
evidence showing that manifestations of the target attribute in the target domain instantiate the 
conditions for representation on the scale type of interest.14  That step establishes what I call 
Representational Interpretability. 
																																																								
13 See (Michell [1993]) on the history of representational ideas of measurement. 
14 In practice the activities for establishing Representational Interpretability interconnect with 
coordination of the attribute-indicator relationship. For present purposes it suffices to zoom in on 
the former. 
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How do RTM and psychometrics contribute to Representational Interpretability? I 
argue that RTM provides a formal characterization of the conditions for a meaningful interpretation. 
In other words, RTM shows that if conditions x, y and z are fulfilled, then there is a numerical 
representation that is interpretable in terms of the empirical system that fulfills those conditions. 
On the other hand, some psychometric techniques supply empirical and statistical evidence for (or 
against) the antecedent of the conditional statement. The Complementarity Claim (CC) can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Complementarity Claim (CC): RTM and psychometrics are complementary approaches 
in the sense that they contribute in different, interlinking ways to the body of evidence 
that establishes a crucial measurement property called Representational 
Interpretability. 
 
Before we embark on the argument that leads to the Complementarity Claim, let me 
emphasize that while I believe that Representational Interpretability is necessary for measurement, 
it is likely not sufficient. To be sufficient, the conditions of measurement would have to include, for 
example, a more detailed account of the aforementioned coordination of the indicator-attribute 
relationship. This account might specify how the target attribute (causally) interacts with the 
measurement instrument so as to bring about an interpretable numerical representation. Since the 
aim here is not a comprehensive theory of measurement (and since these matters have been 
discussed extensively elsewhere, for example Chang [2004]; Tal [2016]; Cartwright et al [2016]; 
McClimans et al [2017]), but rather an account of how RTM and psychometrics can complement 
each other, we can safely zoom in on Representational Interpretability, while simultaneously 
acknowledging that there is more to measurement than that.  
The argument leading to the Complementarity Claim is complicated, which is why I 
divide the discussion into three parts. First, I explain the Complementarity Claim conceptually. 
Second, I show how complementarity looks like in practice. Third, I return to philosophical literature 
on social scientific measurement and embed my argument in it. 
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3 Complementarity, Conceptually 
3.1 RTM: Conditions of representational interpretability 
Measurement is almost invariably considered to involve numerical representation. The need for 
Representational Interpretability arises from the further observation that when it comes to 
measurement, not all numerical representations are created equal. The requirement of 
Representational Interpretability reflects the intuition that some numerical representations are 
more appropriate than others to represent certain empirical relations.  
Why is Representational Interpretability necessary for measurement? Take our simple 
example from before, Maya and her transitive strict preferences over cakes: Lemon ≻ Strawberry ≻ Chocolate. If any numerical assignment would do, we could assign numbers to cakes as follows: 
Lemon → −1, Strawberry → 100 and Chocolate →  50. But assigning 3 to Lemon, 2 to Strawberry 
and 1 to Chocolate is informative about an interesting property of Maya’s preferences, namely, 
order, which the former assignment fails to account for. If you agree that measurement should be 
able to weed out the former assignment because it doesn’t lend itself to a meaningful interpretation 
of Maya’s preferences, you should agree that some kind of Representational Interpretability is 
crucial for measurement.  
What exactly does it take for a numerical representation to be interpretable in terms 
of the targeted empirical system? A plausible suggestion is that a numerical structure has to mirror 
the empirical structure it is supposed to represent. In the example of Maya’s preferences, mirroring 
means that the assigned numbers have such an ordering relation to each other that it reflects the 
preference ordering of the cakes. But there are other, more complex structures. For example: if we 
have four rods a, b, c and d such that when they are set side by side, the difference between the 
length of a and b is equal to that between c and d, a useful numerical representation mirrors this, 
so that the difference between the numbers assigned to a and b is equal to that between numbers 
assigned to c and d. For example, the assignment a → 4, b → 3, c → 6, d → 5 works but a → 4, b → 
3, c → 6, d → 2 doesn’t.  
As many philosophical theories of scientific representation, these examples of 
mirroring capitalize on our intuitions of structural similarity: ordering of numerals mirrors ordering 
of entities, equalities of numbers mirrors equalities of entities (in terms of an attribute) and so on. 
But a general definition of representation in terms of similarity is notoriously elusive.15  Fortunately, 																																																								
15 See for example (van Fraassen [2008]; Isaac [2013]). 
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common scale types allow us to enumerate some similarity relations that ground interpretations of 
numbers in terms of the targeted empirical structure without recourse to a general definition of 
representation. The most common mirrorings that allow intuitive interpretations of numbers in 
terms of entities, and that thus imply Representational Interpretability, are ones where: i) order 
relations between numbers map onto order relations between entities (ordinal scales), ii) 
(in)equalities of differences between numbers map onto (in)equalities of differences between 
entities (interval scales), and iii) (in)equalities of ratios between numbers map onto (in)equalities of 
ratios between entities (ratio scales) when entities are compared in terms of the degree to which 
they manifest the target attribute. There are other scale classifications and thus other interesting 
mirrorings, but the most common ones suffice presently. 
The representation and uniqueness theorems of RTM are crucial for establishing the 
conditions under which such mirrorings hold. The whole point of the representation theorem is to 
show what conditions an empirical relational system has to fulfill in order for it to map onto a 
numerical system of interest. The uniqueness theorem, in turn, establishes how the numbers in the 
numerical assignment can be transformed without breaking the mapping between the empirical 
relations and the numerical ones, thus establishing the relevant scale type. In supplying the 
axiomatic conditions for representation on the above-enumerated familiar scales, RTM sets forth 
constraints for mirrorings between empirical and numerical systems, and thus contributes to the 
establishment of Representational Interpretability. 
Let us summarize. The axiomatizations RTM supplies are conditions for certain 
mirrorings between empirical and numerical systems. Mirrorings, in turn, are our grounds for 
interpreting numerical assignments in terms of empirical systems, that is, they ground 
Representational Interpretability. Moreover, knowledge of mirrorings is crucial for knowing what 
kinds of arithmetic (and statistical) operations can be meaningfully applied to the numbers. For 
example, taking the arithmetic mean of ordinal values is not meaningful because arithmetic mean 
is not defined for ordinal scales. The same applies to more complicated operations (see Stevens 
[1951]; Luce [1959]). For present purposes, we need not settle what scales allow for what 
operations. Rather the take home is this: established mirroring relations ground Representational 
Interpretability, allowing us to weed out uninformative numerical representations (such as my first 
suggestion for presenting Maya’s cake preferences) and meaningless operations (such as taking the 
arithmetic mean of ordinal values).  
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3.2 Psychometrics: Evidence of representational interpretability 
At this stage we should note that RTM does not tell us anything about how to establish that 
particular axiomatic conditions are fulfilled. Consider the axiom of transitivity, which is a necessary 
conditions for an ordinal representation: If 𝑎 ≽	𝑏 and 𝑏 ≽	𝑐, then 𝑎 ≽	𝑐. The axiom does not (and is 
not meant to) tell us how to establish that the transitive relations hold in a given empirical situation. 
In fact, the axiom itself doesn’t even tell us how to interpret the relationship 𝑎 ≽	𝑏. 𝑎 and 𝑏 might 
be rods or commodities or people, and the operator ≽ might be interpreted as “at least as long as” 
or “at least as preferred as” or “at least as well off as”. Even when the axioms are given in an 
interpreted form, the question of establishing that such conditions hold in a particular empirical 
situation is something that representation and uniqueness theorems cannot solve. It is one thing to 
argue that preferences can be represented on an ordinal scale if and only if preferences are 
transitive, and quite another to argue that stated preference questionnaires show reliably that 
people’s preferences in fact are transitive. 
These considerations are meant to crystallize that there are two sides of 
Representational Interpretability: one is establishing conditional statements concerning the 
conditions under which an interpretable numerical representation holds, and another one is 
establishing that those conditions hold in a specific context. My Complementarity Claim rests on the 
observation that some (but not all!) psychometric models instantiate axiomatic conditions 
expressed in RTM. That is, although a psychometric model is never stated in terms of axioms, some 
models postulate structures that embed assumptions about conditions of Representational 
Interpretability. Tests of fit between data and such models can therefore act as evidence that we 
have an interpretable numerical representation of the target system. In summary: 
 
P1: If structural empirical conditions expressed in axioms x, y and z are fulfilled then we 
have an ordinal/interval/ratio level representation of the attributes of interest.16  
P2: If the attributes of interest have the structure postulated in psychometric model P, 
then manifestations of the attribute fulfill structural empirical conditions x, y, and z. 
																																																								
16 Sometimes this premise is a biconditional statement. 
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P3: If empirical tests of fit between data and psychometric model P show that the data 
fits the model, then we have evidence that the attributes of interest have the structure 
postulated in psychometric model P.17 
Conclusion1: If the data fit model P, we have evidence that the attributes of interest are 
representable on an ordinal/interval/ratio scale. 
RI2: The requirement for Representational Interpretability is fulfilled if and only if the 
attributes of interest are representable on the scale type of interest.18 
Conclusion2. If the data fit model P, we have evidential support for the fulfillment of the 
requirement of Representational Interpretability. 
 
The conclusion of the argument is not the Complementarity Claim. But the argument clinches the 
Complementarity Claim in this sense: when we fill in the argument outline with supporting evidence 
for each premise, we can see that the axiomatizations of RTM and certain psychometric models 
have interlocking roles to play in supporting Representational Interpretability. The representation 
and uniqueness theorems of RTM constitute proofs for statements that have the form expressed in 
P1. P2, when suitably filled in, is true by virtue of a demonstrable mathematical connection between 
a particular psychometric model and a particular axiomatization. P3 is an empirical claim about the 
potency of statistical tests of how well the psychometric model fits the data. RI2 expresses more 
compactly the idea captured in RI1. 19 
 To put flesh to the bones of this argument, we will study a psychometric model known 
as the Rasch model. There is a small technical literature within psychometrics that explores whether 
or not, and in what sense the Rasch model is an instantiation of an RTM-style axiomatic structure 
known as conjoint measurement (Michell [2014]; Kyngdon [2011]; Embretson and Reise [2000]; 
Borsboom and Mellenbergh [2004]). I will now explicate the nature of the connection between 
Rasch and conjoint measurement and use it to drive home the Complementarity Claim. 
 
 
																																																								
17 A more precise formulation of the argument in terms of evidence is given in section 4.2. 
18 The scale type of interest depends on the researcher and the questions she aims to answer.  
19 Since scales are distinguished informally according to the kinds of relations a numerical 
representation is informative of, we can shorten RI1 to RI2. For more on the formal definition of 
scales in terms of uniqueness properties, see Suppes and Zinnes ([1963]). 
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4 Complementarity in Action 
4.1 What is the Rasch model? 
The Rasch model is one of several models known as Item Response Theory (IRT) models.20 It was 
first proposed by Danish mathematician Georg Rasch ([1960]). Rasch, like other IRT models, is often 
thought of as an alternative to Classical Test Theory (CTT), which has been and is the standard of 
psychometric testing at least since 1930s (Embretson and Reise [2000], 13). The Rasch model, like 
all IRT models, explains the probability of a correct response to a test question (or the probability 
of a specific response, when dealing with multiple response categories per item)21 as a result of the 
influence of the ability level 22  of the examinee and characteristics of the test items, where 
‘characteristic’ denotes things like the difficulty of the item.  
Rasch is the simplest IRT model: it includes one item characteristic, namely, difficulty, 
while other models include parameters for characteristics such as item discrimination (how 
informative the item is of different ability levels) and susceptibility to guessing (how likely low-ability 
examinees are to guess the correct response). The more complex models are often needed, because 
typically test performance cannot be explained (predicted) only in terms of ability and the difficulty 
of the item. If the response data does not “fit” the simplest model, more complex models may be 
examined.  
There are two widely used versions of the Rasch model, one that treats probability of 
the correct response as a dependent variable and one that treats log-odds of a correct response as 
the dependent variable. The first Rasch model specifies the following relation: 
 𝑃:(𝜃) = 	 exp	(𝜃 − 𝛽:)1 + exp	(𝜃 − 𝛽:) 
 
where 𝑃:(𝜃)	is the probability of a correct response to item i from a randomly selected examinee whose 
ability level is 𝜃, and 
																																																								
20 I follow Embretson and Reise ([2000]) and Engelhard ([2013]), although some authors specify IRT 
so that Rasch is not part of these models. 
21 I discuss dichotomous items, i.e. ones that are either correct/incorrect or endorse/not endorse.  
22 The notion of ‘ability’ is used here for convenience, but Rasch does apply to attributes that are 
perhaps less obviously ‘abilities’.  
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𝛽:  is the item difficulty parameter. 
 
 When the model is used in psychometric practice, the data that is collected using the 
psychometric instrument of interest is tested against the Rasch model. The first step is estimating 
item and ability parameters from the data, that is, estimating the difficulty of the individual items 
and the abilities of examinees. A popular method for doing this is joint maximum likelihood method. 
The details of this process do not matter much for present purposes, for our focus is on goodness-
of-fit tests between the Rasch model and data.23  Roughly speaking, the joint maximum likelihood 
method estimates the ability of an examinee by investigating the likelihood of her response pattern 
(correct/incorrect on each item) conditional upon different levels of latent ability. The same kind of 
estimation is done for the item difficulty parameter, and the re-estimation of the two parameters 
is done iteratively until neither parameter changes in two consecutive estimation steps.24 
Once the parameters have been estimated, one tests the fit between the Rasch model 
and the data. To that end, a battery of statistical tests is imposed on the estimates that joint 
maximum likelihood method yields. For example, one goodness-of-fit test divides the examinees to 
ability groups based on the ability estimates, and compares the observed response patterns of each 
group with the predictions of the Rasch model (see Hambleton et al [1991], 59; Embretson and Reise 
[2000], ch. 9). In simplistic terms: one plugs in a given ability value a and a given item difficulty level 
d into the Rasch model and then proceeds to check whether the thus computed probability of 
correct response matches the actual frequency with which individuals of ability a gave the correct 
answer to an item that is of difficulty d. If the data fits the model well in the sense that the 
predictions of the model and the observed response patterns converge to a degree that is judged 
reasonably high, that is taken as evidence that the attribute of interest has the attribute structure 
postulated in the Rasch model. Importantly, lack of fit between the model and the data means that 
either the test is not appropriate or the hypothesized model of the target attribute is not 
appropriate. Either way, further study needs to be conducted to achieve measure validity.  
While the focus of this paper is the Rasch model, one must keep in mind that validation 
of a psychometric measure does not end with Rasch analysis. By scrutinizing some measurement 
properties, Rasch contributes pieces to the larger validity puzzle, while remaining silent on other 																																																								
23 For more on parameter estimation, see (Embretson and Reise [2000]; Hambleton et al [1991]). 
24 The epistemic benefits of iteration are famous in philosophy of measurement. See (Chang 
[2004]). 
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aspects. Tests of construct validity, for example, are also an important part of a full-fledged 
validation exercise.25 These other methods need not concern us here though, for our focus is a single 
desirable property – Representational Interpretability – and Rasch’s role in establishing it.26 
 In the next section, I argue that tests of fit with the Rasch model provide evidence of 
Representational Interpretability, because they test the fulfillment of requirements for 
measurement on an interval scale. These requirements are set forth in the so-called theory of 
conjoint measurement, which is a brainchild of the RTM approach and which I will introduce in the 
next section. Because the Rasch model is an instance of the psychometric approach while conjoint 
measurement is an instance of the RTM approach, the case of the Rasch model demonstrates the 
complementarity of RTM and psychometrics. 
 
4.2 Rasch and conjoint measurement 
The theory of conjoint measurement (also known as additive conjoint measurement or 
simultaneous conjoint measurement) is one of the most celebrated axiomatizations in the RTM 
tradition. It was first proposed by psychologist R. Duncan Luce and statistician John Tukey in 1964. 
They were motivated by the fact that axiomatizations of cardinal measurement structures required 
that the attribute of interest allows side-by-side combination (so-called concatenation), but 
psychological attributes do not allow for such operations. We can compare the length of rigid rods 
by observing them side-by-side but we cannot set Andy’s happiness next to Bobby’s happiness and 
compare them. Luce and Tukey’s proposed an axiomatization of so-called conjoint measurement, 
which achieves interval level measurement of attributes that do not allow for concatenation.  
																																																								
25 There is even a Complementarity Claim II to be made here, because it can be argued that 
construct validation techniques contribute to the establishment of a valuable measurement 
property that neither RTM nor the Rasch model can establish. While RTM and the Rasch model 
help determine measurement level, construct validation techniques help determine that the 
correct denotation of the target construct is captured i.e. not that the target entities are 
represented at the appropriate measurement level but rather that what is being represented (at 
whatever level) is relations between entities in terms of the correct target attribute. The 
explication of this other valuable measurement property, and the potential complementarity 
between RTM, the Rasch model and psychometric construct validation techniques, deserve a 
paper of their own. 
26 The Rasch model can fulfil other functions, which are not relevant for the present argument. 
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The axioms of conjoint measurement describe an empirical structure in which one 
attribute can be described as the simultaneous ‘effect’27 of two other attributes. More precisely, 
the axioms describe a situation where an attribute Y, which is the joint effect of component factors 
D and A, is the sum of the effect of A as captured by real-valued function φ and of the effect of B as 
captured by real-valued function ψ, i.e. Y = φ(D) + ψ(A) – in other words the component factors 
combine additively to form the joint effect. Luce and Tukey [1964] use the example that loudness 
of a tone can be thought as the effect of frequency and intensity of the tone.  
The Rasch model is another example of the kind of attribute structure conjoint 
measurement corresponds to, because it posits that the probability (or log-odds) of a correct 
response to a test item can be thought of as the effect of difficulty of the question and the ability of 
the respondent. The fact that Rasch model instantiates the additive attribute structure can be 
readily seen from the log-odds version of the Rasch model: 
 ln	 (𝑃:D)(1 − 𝑃:D) = 𝜃D −	𝛽:  
 
where 𝑃:D	is the probability of a correct response to item i from subject s,  𝜃D is the ability level of subject s, and 𝛽:  is the item difficulty parameter (see Embretson and Reise [2000], 148). 
 
This mathematical connection between Rasch and conjoint measurement was first noted by Keats 
([1967]) and since then several people have discussed it (for example Perline et al [1979]; Andrich 
[1988]; Wright and Stone [1999]; Borsboom and Mellenbergh [2004]; Kyngdon [2008]; Embertson 
and Reise [2000]; Michell [2014]; Bond and Fox [2001]). However, the subject is not well-known and 
exists in the margins of psychometric literature. There’s also ambiguity about the sense in which 
Rasch ‘instantiates’ conjoint measurement. 28   It is hard to find a thorough explication of the 
relationship in the literature, which is why I shall supply one here.   
																																																								
27 I follow Luce and Tukey ([1964]) in using this term.  
28 Some people have disputed that the Rasch model instantiates conjoint measurement (for 
example Kyngdon [2008]). I believe the disagreement stems from different readings of 
”instantiates”, which is why a thorough explication is needed here.  
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For our purposes, the most important axioms of conjoint measurement are the so-
called cancellation axioms, and I shall focus on them.29 This narrower focus is warranted, first, 
because the literature treats these axioms as the crucial targets of empirical testing of the conjoint 
structure (Embretson & Reise [2000], 148–149; Luce et al [1991], ch. 21.8). Second, to show the 
complementarity of RTM and psychometrics, we need both approaches to contribute to the 
establishment of Representational Interpretability, and empirical study of the fulfillment of some 
axioms is a contribution to that aim, even if we couldn’t scrutinize all the axioms via the Rasch 
model. Third, it is possible that the Rasch model contributes evidence concerning the fulfillment of 
Solvability and the Archimedean axiom, but these contributions cannot be discussed independent 
of the details of the specific attributes under scrutiny (e.g. is the test measuring e.g. mathematical 
ability, quality of life etc.). This is because these axioms specify assumptions about the kinds of 
values each attribute can take. It is widely agreed that these axioms do not allow direct empirical 
testing but are rather accepted or rejected on the basis of ‘general considerations’ (see Luce et al 
[1991], section 21.8.4). Finally, the axiom of Weak order, involving conditions such as transitivity, is 
so weak that it is easy to see that the additive structure postulated in Rasch instantiates it.  
To get a grasp of the cancellation axioms, consider Table 1, where each column 
corresponds to a value of one of the component factors (e.g. letters a, b, c are values for the 
component factor ‘ability’), rows correspond to values of the other component factor (here letters 
d, e, f can be thought of as values for the component factor ‘item difficulty’) and the ordered pairs 
in each cell correspond to the joint effect (e.g. probability of correct response). The so-called single 
cancellation axiom requires that the relative order of levels of the effect attribute for any two levels 
of one component factor is the same regardless of the level of the second component factor. Table 
1 illustrates this axiom: the order of the cells for two values of the column variable (a and b) is the 
same for all levels of the row variable (d, e, f), as indicated by the sameness of the direction of the 
arrows: 
 
 
 
 																																																								
29 The presentation of the axioms differs slightly from article to article. I present the axioms in a 
form I take to be most common in contemporary literature (see e.g. Kyngdon [2008]; Embretson 
and Reise [2000]). 
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 a b c 
d (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) 
e (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) 
f (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) 
 
Table 1. a, b, c are levels of one of the component attributes while d, e and f are levels of the other 
component attribute. The ordered pairs in the cells represent levels of the effect attribute.30 
 
Another important axiom, known as double cancellation axiom, is often expressed graphically as in 
Table 2. The verbal interpretation is that if the order relations indicated by the dashed arrows hold, 
then the order relation indicated by the solid arrow must also hold. 
 
 a b c 
d (d, a) (d, b) (d, c) 
e (e, a) (e, b) (e, c) 
f (f, a) (f, b) (f, c) 
 
Table 2. Interpretation of columns, rows and cells as in Table 1.  
 
From the axiomatization that Luce and Tukey give, they arrive at their seminal conclusion 
concerning interval level representability: 
 
From the axioms we give, simultaneous measurement on interval scales is obtained for each kind of 
quantity separately and for their joint effects. (Luce and Tukey [1964], 2): 
 
In other words their seminal representation and uniqueness theorems showed that if the axioms 
(only two of which have been presented here) are fulfilled, the component attributes as well as the 
effect attribute have a meaningful interval level representation. (For the full axiomatization and the 
theorems see Luce and Tukey [1964]).  
																																																								
30 To keep tables readable, not all arrows have been drawn. 
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With these axioms and representational results at hand, we get a more detailed 
account of the connection between conjoint measurement and the Rasch model. Beyond noting the 
sameness of the attribute structure, a further illustration of the connection between Rasch and 
conjoint measurement can be given by plugging in any item and ability levels in the Rasch model 
and calculating probability values to complete a two-way table, as in Table 3 and Table 4. It is easy 
to see that the above-described cancellation axioms are fulfilled when the Rasch model fits 
perfectly. 
 
     Ability      
    
 
−1 0 1 1,5 
   −1 
 
0.50 0.73 0.88 0.92 
Item  0 
 
0.27 0.50 0.73 0.82 
Difficulty  0,5 
 
0.18 0.38 0.62 0.73 
   1 
 
0.12 0.27 0.50 0.62 
 
Table 3. Demonstration of the single cancellation axiom with the Rasch model. The cells present 
probabilities calculated from the Rasch model. Interpretation of arrows as in Table 1.  
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     Ability      
    −1 0 1 1,5 
   −1 0.50 0.73 0.88 0.92 
Item  0 
 
0.27 0.50 0.73 0.82 
Difficulty  0,5 0.18 
 
0.38 0.62 0.73 
   1 0.12 0.27 0.50 0.62 
 
Table 4. Demonstration of the double cancellation axiom with the Rasch model. Interpretation of 
arrows as in Table 2.  
 
We have now seen what is meant by the claim that the Rasch model instantiates the attribute 
structure of conjoint measurement: when the attributes have the structure postulated in the Rasch 
model, levels of the three attributes form the patterns postulated in the experimentally 
(dis)confirmable axioms. On grounds of Luce and Tukey’s theorems, we also know that conjoint 
measurement yields an interval level representation. Following this, goodness-of-fit tests with the 
Rasch model can act as tests of whether a specific target attribute has the structure that allows it to 
be represented on an interval scale. How? Recall that the goodness-of-fit tests check whether the 
data conforms to the predictions of the Rasch model. As we see from Tables 3 and 4, the Rasch 
model predicts that the data forms the kinds of patterns that fulfill the cancellation axioms of 
conjoint measurement. So the better the predictions of the Rasch model converge with patterns in 
the data, the more we have evidence that the target attribute fulfills the cancellation axioms. This 
in turn is evidence for interval level representability. In summary: 
 
P1RASCH: If we have evidence that the axioms of conjoint measurement are fulfilled then 
we have evidence of an interval level representation of the attributes of interest.  
P2RASCH: If we have evidence that the attribute of interest has the structure postulated 
in the Rasch model, then we have evidence that manifestations of the attributes fulfill 
the axioms of conjoint measurement.  
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P3RASCH: If empirical tests of fit between data and the Rasch model show that the data 
fits the model, then we have evidence that the attributes of interest have the structure 
postulated in the Rasch model. 31  
RI2: The requirement for Representational Interpretability is fulfilled if and only if the 
attributes of interest are representable on the scale type of interest. 
ConclusionRASCH: If the data fit the Rasch model, we have evidential support for the 
fulfillment of the requirement of Representational Interpretability. 
 
Note that the truth of P3RASCH is trivial conceptually speaking, because the whole point of goodness-
of-fit tests is to inform us whether or not the attribute has the relevant structure. Empirically 
speaking, though, a good fit to the Rasch model does not clinch the case for the attributes having 
the postulated structure. There are a variety of reasons for this, for example, the procedures of 
model parameter estimation and the goodness-of-fit tests have their own shortcomings and 
implementation-related difficulties (Embretson and Reise [2000]; Hambleton et al [1991]). 
Furthermore, testing the fit between data and the Rasch model means that a number of 
postulations about the target attribute are being tested simultaneously, and it is notoriously difficult 
to disentangle the source of the failure to fit the model (Borsboom and Mellenberg [2004]). That is 
why we need other methods to strengthen our conclusions concerning Representational 
Interpretability. For example, Kyngdon ([2011]) proposes tests that are meant to overcome blind 
spots of standard goodness-of-fit tests.  
 All this is to hammer the hopefully obvious point that Rasch, like any validation 
technique, is not all-encompassing. That does not undermine the present argument. The point is 
not that Rasch is fool-proof method for testing axioms, but that Rasch constitutes a psychometric 
technique for generating evidence for (or against) the empirical instantiations of structures 
postulated in the RTM approach. In doing so, it shows the complementarity of psychometrics and 
RTM in the establishment of Representational Interpretability.  
 
 
																																																								
31 Assuming that the measure has been validated in other respects, e.g. that the data pertains to 
the attribute of interest (e.g. mathematical ability) rather than a different one (e.g. reading 
comprehension). Construct validation is the standard way of addressing this aspect.	
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5 Conclusion: Critics and Fruits of Complementarity 
I have argued that Representational Interpretability is an important measurement property and that 
RTM and psychometric techniques can complement each other in establishing this property. I 
argued for the complementarity of RTM and psychometrics by showing that both approaches play 
a crucial role in a valid argument leading to a conclusion about Representational Interpretability. To 
show what complementarity looks like, I argued that usage of the psychometric model known as 
the Rasch model yields evidence of Representational Interpretability, because it acts as a test of 
conditions of conjoint measurement, which is an instance of the RTM approach.  
One might be tempted to object that there is an inconsistency in my description of the 
measurement literature: on the one hand I have claimed that the interrelations of RTM and 
psychometrics are largely unexplored, on the other hand I have said that the mathematical 
connection between the Rasch model and conjoint measurement has been known at least since 
1967. Doesn’t the latter claim undermine the former?  
No. Both claims are well-founded, because in practice the establishment of the 
connection between the Rasch model and conjoint measurement has not translated into a 
recognition of the complementarity of RTM and psychometrics. Why? Firstly, the connection 
between the Rasch model and conjoint measurement is still poorly known outside the theoretical 
literature on the Rasch model (see Perline et al [1979]). We can see this from the fact that when 
psychometricians use the Rasch model, they rarely justify its usage with reference to the connection 
between the Rasch model and conjoint measurement. For example, in a widely cited paper on the 
validity of the HAM–D measure of depression, the authors Bagby et al ([2004]) use evidence from 
the Rasch model to argue that the measure is not valid, but they say nothing about how the 
connection between Rasch and conjoint measurement is relevant for interpreting the results of the 
test. This is unsurprising: of course a practicing psychometrician cannot stop to scrutinize the 
theoretical underpinnings of each statistical method she uses. While poor understanding of the 
connection between Rasch and conjoint measurement need not undermine inferences about the 
validity of an instrument, it is an obvious obstacle to the acknowledgement of the complementarity 
of RTM and psychometrics.  
Second, the Rasch model is by no means mainstream psychometrics, because the 
Classical Test Theory approach still dominates much of psychometric practice (see McClimans et al 
[2017]; Engelhard [2013]). The relatively limited usage of the Rasch model makes it understandable 
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that the mathematical connection between Rasch and conjoint measurement has not trickled down 
into a general recognition of the complementarity of psychometrics and RTM.  
Moving on to other objections. Some contributors argue that, contrary to my 
treatment of RTM, RTM is not just a formal framework laying out axiomatic conditions of numerical 
representation. Rather, RTM also sets restrictions on the kind of evidence that can vouch for the 
fulfillment of the axioms (Michell [1986]). In particular, some philosophers argue that only direct 
observations of the fulfillment of the axiomatic conditions are permissible evidence according to 
RTM (Michell [1986]; Mari [2000]; Angner [2011]). One way to characterize the difference between 
the presently used interpretation and the alternative, observability-tied interpretation is this: on 
the former interpretation, RTM is a ‘theory of measurement’ laying out representation-related 
formal structures, while on the latter RTM is a ‘strategy of measurement’ that sets out conditions 
for something to count as successful measurement, where some of those conditions pertain to 
permissible empirical evidence for representation. 
The alternative take on RTM gives rise to two objections to the Complementarity 
Claim. First, one might object that the Complementarity Claim fails tout court because it rests on an 
incorrect interpretation of RTM. If we adopt the observability-tied interpretation of RTM, the 
argument goes, then RTM and psychometrics are not complementary, because most of the 
attributes psychometricians are interested in cannot be directly observed in the way RTM (allegedly) 
requires. Second, the Complementarity Claim can be said to fail as a counterproposal to claims 
about the incompatibility of RTM and psychometrics (for example the claims made in Angner 
[2011]), because to first change the operative interpretation of RTM and then argue against the 
incompatibility claims amounts to a change of subject (or even a fallacy of equivocation) rather than 
a genuine challenge.  
Start with the first objection. Although distilling the correct interpretation of RTM from 
the literature is tricky,32 there seems to be ample textual evidence that the authors of Foundations 
of Measurement did not believe that RTM requires direct observational evidence. Krantz and others 
write that ‘[t]he axioms purport to describe relations, perhaps idealized in some fashion, among 
certain potential observations’ (Krantz et al [1971], 26–27, italics added). Sometimes observations 
do not conform to the axiomatic conditions because of the shortcoming of the experimental setting. 																																																								
32 Several people have contributed to laying the foundations of the approach, and there’s no 
guarantee that the exact specification of the approach is constant across individuals or across an 
individual’s career. 
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One possible solution according to the authors is to consider relational statements such as a ≽ b, 
not as statements about observations, but as theoretical statements inferred from the data (Suppes 
et al [1989], 300). Elsewhere Suppes states that in the RTM approach, scales are defined entirely 
independent of the procedures that inform us about the empirical relational system of interest 
(Suppes and Zinnes [1963]; 15): ‘Precisely what empirical observations are involved in the empirical 
system is of no consequence.’ The upshot is that the first objection – claiming that the 
Complementarity Claim rests on an incorrect interpretation of RTM – does not hold water.  
The second RTM-related objection avoids the slippery debate about correctness and 
instead argues that it is fallacious to challenge claims about the incompatibility of RTM and 
psychometrics by simply changing what one takes RTM to stand for. In response, note firstly that 
switching to another interpretation of RTM is a legitimate way to challenge incompatibility claims, 
if one can show that the presently proposed interpretation is better – that is, more accurate and/or 
more expedient – than the one that underwrites the incompatibility claim. I have already argued 
that the present interpretation of RTM resonates better with the writings of the founders of RTM. 
In addition, other authors have argued that a broad interpretation of the applicability of the 
theorems of RTM can reap epistemic benefits, which the narrow observability-tied view cannot 
harvest (Heilmann [2015]). Furthermore, proponents of the alternative take on RTM need to draw 
a line between observable and unobservable relational structures in order to police illegitimate 
applications of RTM. The place of that dividing line is notoriously contested (see for example van 
Fraassen [1980]; Hacking [1983]). By contrast, a proponent of the present interpretation of RTM 
need not get entangled in that thorny debate. Hence there are both correctness- and expediency-
related reasons to focus our attention to the implications of the present take on RTM, which, as the 
Complementarity Claim shows, has much more practical utility than RTM is typically credited for 
(Mari et al [2017]; Boumans [2016]; Reiss [2008]). 
Moreover, the Complementarity Claim is valuable even if it does not constitute a direct 
objection to claims about the incompatibility of psychometrics and RTM. The diagnosis that 
underlies the Complementarity Claim clarifies the interpretations under which psychometrics and 
RTM are complementary. Thus the argument should help end confusion concerning psychometrics 
and RTM, not because it has been conclusively shown that RTM and psychometrics are 
complementary under all interpretations, but because the present analysis allows us to pinpoint 
differences in assumptions that lead to different conclusions about the compatibility of RTM and 
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psychometrics. In addition, the Complementarity Claim calls us to question the present separation 
of the two approaches, which neglects their potential for joint usage. 
Let me finish off with some remarks on why the fruits of complementarity should 
tempt proponents of both approaches. Start with psychometrics. Several authors have argued that 
psychometricians tend to assume that their target attribute can be measured on an interval scale, 
but this assumption is not scrutinized or established empirically (e.g. Borsboom and Zand Scholte 
[2008]; Michell [2008]; Hobart et al [2007]). Part of the problem is that Classical Test Theory is the 
dominant approach in psychometrics, but justifying interval scale properties with CTT is notoriously 
difficult (Embretson and Reise [2000], 28-32). Clearly, the interpretability of measurement results 
suffers if we do not know that an interval level interpretation of the measurement data is justified, 
not least because the choice of appropriate statistical tests depends on it. Incorporating RTM-based 
considerations in psychometric practice would allow for a wider range of hypotheses to gain 
genuine evidential support from psychometric instruments. Note however that even staunch 
supporters of RTM admit that psychometric tests can be powerful predictors in the absence of 
Representational Interpretability (see for example Suppes and Zinnes [1963]). Lack of grounding in 
Representational Interpretability does not make a psychometric test useless, but it does undermine 
its status as measurement. 
What about proponents of RTM? Economists are notably fond of proving 
representation and uniqueness theorems – the advancement of decision theory is a striking 
example of the allegiance between economics and RTM. But economists are frequently charged 
with oversimplifying the attributes they want to measure. In particular, the everyday notion of 
preferences as unobservable, mental desires has been impoverished into the much criticized 
‘preferences as choices’ notion, arguably because capturing preferences qua mental entities is way 
more complex than tracking choice behavior (Angner [2013]). In so far as impoverished 
conceptualizations of the target attribute are unsatisfactory, economists would benefit from an 
increased understanding of how psychometricians handle the measurement of unobservable target 
attributes. In particular, psychometric tools for studying the properties of unobservable attributes 
show that economists cannot appeal to the impossibility of measuring unobservables when 
justifying the move from preferences qua desires to preferences qua choices. It remains to be seen 
what other fruits complementary usage of RTM and psychometrics can reap.  
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